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I. Introduction
Passed largely to address the problem of vote dilution and racially polarized voting, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) bans racial discrimination in voting practices by federal, state,
and local governments. While the VRA has been successful in many respects, several large gaps
remain. In an effort to narrow some of the gaps left by the federal VRA, four states have enacted
or proposed individual state-VRAs or functional equivalents (herein referred to as individual
state-VRAs).
In this paper, I seek to explore how these states have attempted to use individual VRAs—
and how successful they have been—in closing the gaps in coverage existing under the federal
VRA. For each of the four enacted or proposed VRAs, I explore the background of the
legislation, followed by an analysis of how the legislation operates. For California, Illinois, and
Florida—the three states with enacted individual state-VRAs—I then examine how successful
the legislation has been in increasing minority representation, and how it can be strengthened to
further the state’s goals. Since Washington’s VRA has yet to become law, I explore the
background, followed by an analysis of the proposed legislation. I conclude by assessing which
individual state-VRAs—or aspects thereof—are best suited to serve as models for the forty-six
other states without such legislation.
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I find that all four state-VRAs are ultimately successful insofar as they expand protection
against minority vote dilution beyond that which is afforded to minority voters under the federal
VRA. However, the level of success varies by state plan.
II. Federal Voting Rights Act (VRA)
Background and Doctrinal Standard under the VRA
Vote dilution and racially polarized voting have historically been—and continue to be—a
major concern in the United States. Vote dilution is the practice of reducing the potential
effectiveness of a group’s voting strength by limiting the group’s chances to translate voting
strength into voting power.1 Vote dilution occurs when a racial group’s electoral choice becomes
submerged due to the racial polarization of the vote, and where a traditional white majority
precludes a minority group’s choices from having any bearing or significant meaning in an
election on par with white voters in the same election.2 “The usual device for diluting the
minority voting power is the manipulation of district lines by either fragmenting the minority
voters among several districts where a bloc-voting majority can routinely outvote them or
‘packing’ them into one or a small number of districts to minimize their influence in adjacent
districts.”3 Racial polarization occurs when a majority of white voters and a majority of minority
voters in a given jurisdiction are divided.4 This division—or polarization—can be along
preferences for candidates, propositions, referendums, or other measures at the polls.5
To “banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting” and to help ensure that no
citizen’s right to vote shall be “denied or abridged…on account of race or color,” Congress
passed the Voting Rights Act (VRA) in 1965.6 The VRA bans racial discrimination in voting
practices by the federal government, as well as by state and local governments.7 Section 2 of the
VRA creates a cause of action for plaintiffs who have been subjected to racial vote dilution or
vote denial. Under Section 2 of the VRA, illegal vote dilution can be found where an electoral
standard, practice, or procedure results in a denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account
of race or color.8 Section 5 of the VRA prohibits practices that have the purpose or effect of
1

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, The Color of Change: Voting Rights in the 21st Century and the
California Voting Rights Act, 15 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 183 (2012).
3
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment, 1176, 83 So. 3d 597 (Fla. 2012),
quoting Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146 (1993).
4
Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, The Color of Change: Voting Rights in the 21st Century and the
California Voting Rights Act, 15 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 183 (2012)., citing Joseph Fishkin, Equal
Citizenship and The Individual Right to Vote, 86 Ind. L.J. 1289, 1360, n. 43-45 (2011)
5
Id, at 1.
6
In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment, 1176, 83 So. 3d 597 (Fla. 2012),
citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), and Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S.
146 (1993).
7
Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal
Structure of the Political Process (Foundation, 2d. Ed. 2001)
8
42 U.S.C. 1973 (2006).
2
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“denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”9 However, Section 5 only
applies to jurisdictions covered under the “coverage formula” of Section 4.10 By declaring the
Section 4 coverage formula unconstitutional in Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court
effectively rendered Section 5 a “zombie provision,” as it is no longer applicable to any
jurisdictions.11
Section 2 remains in force nationwide. Amendments made to Section 2 in 1982 provide
that a violation is to be determined by assessing, based on the “totality of circumstances,”
whether the challenged practice gives racial minorities “less opportunity to participate in the
political process and to elect representatives of their choice.”12 However, Section 2 explicitly
rejects the notion that an implied goal of the VRA is to create complete racialized proportional
representation.13
The Supreme Court has set forth the doctrinal standard for claims of vote dilution under
Section 2 of the VRA. To begin, a minority group challenging a jurisdiction’s policy must
comply with three preconditions that the Court laid out in Thornburg v. Gingles. First, a minority
group must be sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a singlemember district.14 Second, a minority group must be politically cohesive.15 This means that
members of a minority group must vote together and have shared political interests and
preferences. Lastly, the white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to defeat the
minority group’s preferred candidate.16 Once the threshold Gingles criteria are satisfied, the court
examines the totality of circumstances to evaluate whether an electoral practice gives members
of a minority group “less opportunity than other members of the electorate to elect
representatives of their choice.”17 In amending Section 2 in 1982, the Senate outlined nine
important factors to be considered in the totality of circumstances analysis.18 Additionally, the
court considers the proportionality of a minority group’s current representation,19 as well as the
existence of a suitable benchmark for the challenged policy to be compared to.20 Following the
1982 amendments to Section 2, it is clear that liability under Section 2 does not require proof of
discriminatory purpose.21 That is, discriminatory intent is sufficient for Section 2 liability.22

9

Id §1973c(a).
Id; see also id §1973b(b) (setting forth Section 4 coverage formula)
11
Shelby Cty. V. Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013); see also Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The South
After Shelby County, Chicago Public law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 451 (2013)
12
Tokaji, Daniel P. Election Law in a Nutshell, West Law School, 2013.
13
Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, The Color of Change: Voting Rights in the 21st Century and the
California Voting Rights Act, 15 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 183 (2012), citing 42 U.S.C. §1973(b)
(2006).
14
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
42 U.S.C. §1973(b) (2006)
18
Id.
19
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
20
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994)
21
Id.
22
42 U.S.C. §1973(b)
10
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Over time, the Court has narrowed the scope of Section 2—particularly the first Gingles
precondition.23 In Johnson v. DeGrandy, the Court noted that the first Gingles precondition
requires the possibility of creating more than the existing number of opportunity districts for
minority candidates.24 The Court has also held that Section 2 does not extend to districts that are
bizarrely shaped.25 Thus, the court has interpreted the first Gingles precondition to require
geographic compactness for Section 2 liability to attach. The court has taken this even further to
require cultural compactness, which means that districts may not combine over-dissimilar
minority communities to avoid Section 2 liability.26 Lastly, and perhaps most narrowing, the
Court in Bartlett v. Strickland held that it must be possible to create an additional district in
which minority members make up a majority (greater than fifty percent) of the population in
order for Section 2 liability to attach.27 As corollaries to the aforementioned decisions regarding
Section 2 of the VRA, the court has also narrowed the remedies available under Section 2. For
example, it is an impermissible remedy to a Section 2 violation to create districts that: are
bizarrely shaped28, combine overly dissimilar minority communities29, or contain less than fifty
percent of a minority group population30. These limitations significantly narrow the reach and
impact of Section 2 of the VRA.
Gaps in the VRA
Despite the Court doctrinally narrowing the scope of Section 2 of the VRA, it has been
successful in combating vote dilution in many ways. However, several additional gaps remain.
First, the Court’s decision in Bartlett v. Strickland precludes the possibility of extending Section
2 protection to crossover districts. A crossover district is one in which the minority population is
potentially large enough to elect the candidate of its choice with help from voters who are
members of the majority who cross over to support the minority’s preferred candidate.31 The
Court also precluded the possibility of extending Section 2 protection to influence districts.32 An
influence district is one in which a minority group can influence the outcome of an election even
if its preferred candidate cannot be elected.33 It currently remains unclear whether Section 2
extends to coalition districts. A coalition district is one in which two minority groups form a
23

Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, Chicago Public law and Legal
Theory Working Paper No. 451 (2013)
24
Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. at 1008 (1994).
25
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
26
See LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); see also Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The South After
Shelby County, Chicago Public law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 451 (2013), noting
that after LULAC, the court noted that there is no liability under §2 when the relevant minority
population is highly “spatially diverse” or “culturally non-compact”
27
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
28
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996)
29
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)
30
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009).
31
Id at 1242.
32
See LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006), holding that Section 2 does not require the
creation of influence districts
33
Id.
5

coalition to elect the candidate of the coalition’s choice.34 While the court’s insistence on the
creation of majority-minority districts does enhance the potential for increased descriptive
representation for minority candidates, it may come at the expense of increased substantive
representation for minority groups (discussed, infra).35
Litigation under Section 2 can also be prohibitively costly to plaintiffs. While the DOJ
has the authority to bring suit (and to intervene in existing suits) under Section 2, private parties
are the most common plaintiffs in Section 2 actions.36 To bring a Section 2 action, private parties
must go through the formal litigation process—including discovery, trial, and possible appeal—
which is often extraordinarily costly.37 As a result, potential plaintiffs may be deterred from
bringing Section 2 suits. Further, itself constrained by limited resources, the DOJ is less apt to
step in to contest policies promulgated by local governments.38 In light of these two factors, the
difficulty of bringing Section 2 claims is greatest at the local level and in rural communities.39
Due to the weakening of the VRA post-Shelby County and the court’s decisions
constricting Section 2 coverage, state-level efforts to prevent and/or remedy minority vote
dilution are increasingly important. Indeed, with Section 2 narrowed by the Court and Section 5
essentially nullified, the future of voting rights legislation may be at state-level. Recognizing this
and in response to some of the gaps in the VRA, three states have enacted or proposed individual
state Voting Rights Acts. A fourth state—Florida—has attempted to narrow the gaps left from
the VRA via state Constitutional amendment. The aim of this paper is to explore the ways that
these states have aimed to use their individual state-VRAs to close the gaps in coverage that exist
under Section 2 of the federal VRA. For each of the four enacted or proposed VRAs, I will
explore the background of the legislation, followed by an analysis of how the legislation
operates. For California, Illinois, and Florida—the three states with enacted VRAs—I will then
examine how successful the legislation has been in increasing minority representation, and how
it can be strengthened to further the state’s goals. Since Washington’s VRA has yet to become
law, I will explore the background, followed by an analysis of the proposed legislation. I will
conclude by assessing which individual state-VRAs—or aspects thereof—are best suited to serve
as models for the forty-six other states without such legislation.
II. Individual State-VRAs (and Functional Equivalents)
State Voting Rights Acts in California, Illinois, Washington, and (functionally) Florida
have all been enacted or proposed with the goal of broadening protection for minority voters than
that which is afforded under the federal VRA. While each was enacted to address problems and
remedies unique to each respective state, all four aim to address the problem of minority vote
dilution in the redistricting process.
34

Id.
Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal
Structure of the Political Process 889 (Foundation, 2d. Ed. 2001)
36
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, Chicago Public law and Legal
Theory Working Paper No. 451 (2013)
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Shelby Cty v. Holder, 679 F3d at 872; see also Nicholas Stephanopoulos, The South After
Shelby County, Chicago Public law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 451 (2013)
35

6

Underlying the evaluation of each state’s legislation—as well as the VRA—is the tension
between descriptive and substantive minority representation. Descriptive representation refers to
the election of representatives “who share salient qualities with the electorate they represent.”40
That is, descriptive representation is focused on electing representatives that “look like” their
constituents.41 Descriptive representation may be desirable for myriad reasons including, but not
limited to, enhancing the legitimacy of political bodies within the community and fostering a
greater sense of civic inclusion among political minorities.42 Substantive representation, on the
other hand, focuses on electing a legislative body most likely to support the substantive policy
preferences of the given group of voters.43 The tension between both types of representation
raises questions as to whether more minorities in office translates into substantive representation
that is more responsive to the minority community.44 To the extent that there is a strong
correlation between descriptive and substantive representation, the election of more minority
representatives would be a desirable result under individual state-VRAs. To this point, academic
studies have concluded that “verifiable, material changes in local government policy do occur
when racial minorities begin to assume public office.”45 However, scholars continue to question
whether the increased presence of minority-group representatives translates into tangible policy
and other benefits for minority voters.46 That is to say, a white representative may represent the
policy-interests of minority groups just as effectively as a minority representative would—
particularly where there exists a sizeable minority population. Thus, the creation of influence
districts distinctly caters to the goal of increasing substantive representation for minority voters.
I will analyze the four state-VRAs based on the assumption that increased descriptive and
substantive representation are both desirable goals in decreasing minority vote dilution. For the
sake of analysis herein, I assume that increased descriptive representation leads to increased
substantive representation as well.47 This requires the belief that minority voters generally elect
minority candidates to represent them and, therefore, increasing the number of minority
officeholder goes hand-in-hand with enacting legislation that furthers the interests of the
minority community.48 To the extent that this is true and desired, the strongest individual state40

Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan & Richard H. Pildes, The Law of Democracy: Legal
Structure of the Political Process 889 (Foundation, 2d. Ed. 2001)
41
Id.
42
Id at 1198.
43
Id at 889.
44
Id at 1198.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
This is undoubtedly a large assumption that is subject to lengthy debate (see, e.g., below)
48
Charles Cameron, David Epstein, and Sharyn O’Halloran, Do Majority-Minority Districts
Maximize Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, The American Political Science
Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Dec., 1996); NB: it is unclear that minority interests are always best
served by the creation of minority-minority districts. In many instances a tradeoff between
descriptive and substantive representation exists. That is, the creation of majority-minority
districts may dilute minority influence in surrounding areas, which may then elect
representatives unsympathetic to minority concerns. To illustrate this tradeoff, Cameron,
Epstein, and O’Halloran find that in the South, minority substantive representation is maximized
by districts with 47% minority population, whereas everywhere else optimal districting schemes
7

VRAs are those that result in increased descriptive representation. Individual state-VRAs that
operate to primarily impact substantive representation are less strong, but still move closer
toward the desired goal of decreasing minority vote dilution. I will also analyze the extent to
which each of the individual state-VRAs address the specific gaps left by the VRA. In this sense,
individual state-VRAs that most comprehensively seek to remedy gaps left by the VRA are the
strongest. It is helpful to note at the outset, however, that none of the four state-VRAs address all
of the gaps left by the VRA.
A. California Voting Rights Acts (CVRA)
Background
The California Voting Rights Act (CVRA), passed in 2001, seeks to address the problem
of racially polarized voting.49 The CVRA provides a cause of action to members of any racial or
ethnic group that can establish that its members’ votes are diluted through the combination of
racially polarized voting and an at-large election system.50 Responding to the reality in California
that no racial group forms a majority of the state’s population, the CVRA is race-neutral.51 That
is, it was designed to combat vote dilution experienced by any group, including whites.52 The
Assembly Judiciary Committee analysis noted the importance of ensuring that the state’s
electoral system is fair and open, in light of the fact that “we are all minorities.”53 However, the
problem of racially polarized voting has historically been driven by the refusal of white voters to
vote for minority candidates, which deprives minority voters of opportunities to elect candidates
they wish in areas where minority voters do not constitute the majority.54 Despite the current
makeup of the state as a whole, racial polarization between a historically white majority and
traditionally underrepresented minority groups persists in parts of California.55 Accordingly,
though nominally race-neutral, the CVRA was enacted primarily with the aim of protecting such
minority groups from racially polarized voting.

divide minority populations equally. It is worth noting, as Cameron, Epstein and O’Halloran do,
that the overall efficacy of majority-minority districts remains unresolved. As such, for the sake
of analysis herein, I have made the above assumptions.
49
Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, The Color of Change: Voting Rights in the 21st Century and the
California Voting Rights Act, 15 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 183 (2012)
50
Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 145 Cal. App. 4th 660 (2006).
51
Id., holding that the CVRA is race-neutral and that all persons, regardless of race, have
standing under the CVRA to sue for race-based vote dilution.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, The Color of Change: Voting Rights in the 21st Century and the
California Voting Rights Act, 15 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 183 (2012)
55
Id, citing Matt Barreto, Christian R. Grose & Ana Henderson, Redistricting: Coalition
Districts and the Voting Rights Act, Research Brief for the Chief Justice Earl Warren Institute on
Law and Social Policy, University of California, Berkeley Law School, May 2011 at 3-8.
8

Another important aim of the CVRA is to provide a broader cause of action for vote
dilution than was provided for by the VRA.56 Specifically, the California Legislature wanted to
remove the Gingles requirement that in order to establish liability for vote dilution, plaintiffs
must show that a compact, concentrated majority-minority district is possible.57 This will be
analyzed in greater depth in the following section.
Analysis
The California Voting Rights Act closely mirrors the VRA in several ways. However,
there are notable departures. As such, it is helpful to analyze the CVRA in terms of differences
from and similarities to the VRA.
The first main difference between the CVRA and the VRA is that the CVRA eliminates the
first Gingles precondition, which requires a minority group to be sufficiently large and
geographically compact before Section 2 liability will attach.58 Specifically, Section 14028(c) of
the CVRA states: “the fact that members of a protected class are not geographically compact or
concentrated may not preclude a finding of racially polarized voting.”59 Whereas Section 2 of the
VRA protects only compact, concentrated minorities, this provision of the CVRA operates to
afford protection to smaller, dispersed minority groups. Thus, this provision eliminates a major
shortcoming of the VRA. Under the CVRA, geographic compactness and population
concentration may still factor in at the remedy stage.60 According to a bill analysis (on what
ultimately became the CVRA) for the Assembly Committee on Judiciary,
“[The CVRA] recognizes that geographical concentration is an appropriate question
at the remedy stage. However, geographical compactness would not appear to be an
important factor in assessing whether the voting rights of a minority group have been
diluted or abridged by an at-large system. Thus, this bill puts the voting rights horse
(the discrimination issue) back where it sensibly belongs in front of the cart (what
type of remedy is appropriate once racially polarized voting has been shown.)”61
The effect of this construction makes it easier for a plaintiff to bring a vote dilution claim under
the CVRA by eliminating geographic compactness and concentration as requirements, while
simultaneously broadening the potential for relief by allowing—but not requiring—geographic
compactness and concentration to be considered as remedies. That is, compact, majorityminority districts can, but need not, be drawn as remedies under the CVRA. Thus, by broadening
the cause of action for vote dilution, the CVRA affords protection to a wider class of potential
plaintiffs than does the VRA.

56

Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 145 Cal. App. 4th 660, 669 (2006).
Id.
58
Id.
59
Cal. Elec. Code §14028(c)
60
Id.
61
Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 976 (2001–2002 Reg. Sess.) as amended
Apr.9, 2002, p. 3.
57
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Second, the CVRA explicitly takes influence districts into account.62 While the Court has
interpreted the VRA as not to apply to influence districts,63 the text of the CVRA states:
“An at-large method of election may not be imposed or applied in a manner that
impairs the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to
influence the outcome of an election, as a result of the dilution or the abridgment of
the rights of voters who are members of a protected class.”64
Thus, a claim under the CVRA may result from elections where a small group can show that it
has voted cohesively as a block to influence—yet not necessarily change—the outcome of an
election.65 While neither the federal nor California courts have delineated a precise standard
defining “ability to influence,” its mere textual inclusion suggests a broader standard applies than
that which applies under the Court’s interpretation of the VRA.66
Third, the CVRA places a higher probative value on prior evidence of discriminatory atlarge systems.67 Section 14028(a) explicitly states that “elections conducted prior to the filing of
an action pursuant to Section 14027 and [14028] are more probative to establish the existence of
racially polarized voting than elections conducted after the filing of the action.”68 The CVRA
“thus treats post hoc cosmetic changes to a discriminatory at-large system as preliminarily
suspect and not worthy of the same probative value as prior evidence.”69 Fourth, “other factors”
(akin to the totality of circumstances inquiry of the VRA) which hinder a protected class’s
“ability to participate effectively in the political process, and the use of overt or subtle racial
appeals in political campaigns are probative, but not necessary factors” to establish a CVRA
violation.70 Thus, in theory, a plaintiff’s claim under the CVRA could prevail absent a showing
of any of the Court’s delineated “totality of circumstances” factors.
Lastly, the CVRA enlarges the potential options for relief upon a finding of vote dilution.
Section 14029, which governs remedies for violation of Sections 14027 and 14028, is notably
vague in terms of what specific remedies are required.71 The section states: “upon a finding of a
violation…the court shall implement appropriate remedies, including the imposition of district62

Cal. Elec. Code §14027
LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)
64
Cal. Elec. Code §14027, emphasis added.
65
Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, The Color of Change: Voting Rights in the 21st Century and the
California Voting Rights Act, 15 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 183 (2012)
66
Id, citing Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. at 1248 (2009).
67
Cal. Elec. Code §14028(a)
68
Id.
69
Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, The Color of Change: Voting Rights in the 21st Century and the
California Voting Rights Act, 15 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 183 (2012)
70
Cal. Elec. Code §14028(e), including as “other factors”: history of discrimination, the use of
electoral devices or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the dilutive effects of
at-large elections, denial of access to those processes determining which groups of candidates
will receive financial or other support in a given election, and the extent to which members of a
protected class bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment,
and health
71
Cal. Elec. Code §14029
63
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based elections, that are tailored to remedy the violation.”72 This affords judges a large amount
of discretion at the remedy stage, which opens the door to a variety of potential remedies, many
of which are unavailable under the VRA.73 By eliminating the requirement of sufficient minority
population size under the VRA, a court could create crossover, coalition, or influence districts as
remedies under the CVRA.74 Additionally, a court is not limited to imposing district-based
remedies.75 A court could theoretically impose an alternative at-large voting system as a remedy
under CVRA.76 For example, a court could impose as a remedy a cumulative voting system, in
which each voter has as many votes as there are seats.77 Under such a system, a voter can choose
to allocate all of his/her votes to one candidate or to distribute his/her votes evenly among
several candidates.78 With cumulative voting, a politically cohesive but geographically dispersed
minority group could potentially elect a single candidate by giving all of its votes to that
candidate.79 This would be the case despite the fact that the same group may be unable to elect
any candidates in a winner-take-all at-large system and could not form a majority in any feasible
district in a district-based system.80
Two other alternative forms of at-large voting systems—limited voting and preferential
voting—may also be available as remedies under the CVRA. Under a limited voting system,
every voter has one vote, and the available seats are distributed between the top vote-getters.81
For example, if a city council has five seats, each voter would get to vote for one candidate and
the top five ranked candidates would be elected to the council. Under a system of preferential
voting, voters get to rank candidates in their order of preference, and a candidate must receive a
specific quota in order to be elected.82 The result of a preferential voting system ends up being
fairly similar to proportional representation. The court has yet to judicially draw a line limiting
what remedies are available under the CVRA. As such, as the statute currently reads, it can
undoubtedly be argued that any of these forms of potential relief—which are very rare under the
VRA—are available under the CVRA.83 Unless and until the court limits the language of Section
14029, the potential relief is vastly less narrow under the CVRA.
72

Id.
See, e.g. Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. at 1248 (2009); LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399
(2006); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
74
Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 670 (2006).
75
Cal. Elec. Code §14029
76
Sanchez v. City of Modesto, 145 Cal. App. 4th at 670 (2006).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 769 at 835
(Spring 2013).
82
Id.
83
Thus far, only district-based election systems have been utilized as CVRA remedies. There are
two possibilities to explain this result. First, the CVRA explicitly provides that district-based
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Despite these differences, the CVRA draws on the VRA in a variety of ways. First, the
definition of “protected class” is “as referenced and defined in the federal Voting Rights Act.”84
CVRA Section 14028(b) outlines factors and circumstances to determine whether racially
polarized voting has occurred.85 Some of these factors and circumstances borrow from VRA case
law. For example, the extent to which candidates preferred by voters of the protected class, who
identify as members of the protected class, have been elected to the governing body of a local
political subdivision may be considered in determining whether there has been a violation.86
Additionally, the occurrence of racially polarized voting under the CVRA shall be determined
from examining results of elections in which at least one candidate is a member of a protected
class or elections involving ballot measures, or any other electoral choices that affect the rights
and privileges of members of a protected class.87 Finally, similar to the VRA, plaintiffs do not
need to provide proof of discriminatory intent to bring a claim under the CVRA.88
By departing from the VRA in ways that afford broader protection to minority voters,
while at the same time adopting some of the VRA’s original provisions, the CVRA has
ultimately widened the scope and remedies available for vote dilution claims.
Success of the CVRA
Since its enactment in 2001, the CVRA has contributed to advancements made in
decreasing minority vote dilution and getting minority descriptive representation closer to levels
that correspond to their representation in the state’s population. The seminal CVRA case,
Sanchez v. City of Modesto, attracted attention of minority voters in California that had
experienced representational harms; many of whom lived in districts not covered by Section 4 of
the VRA and thus realized that vote dilution claims were feasible.89 To the extent that this
attention has been held and maintained to present, this effect is particularly important for the
handful of jurisdictions in California previously covered under Section 4, given the Court’s
recent decision dismantling Section 4 of the VRA.90
The CVRA has been particularly successful in responding to one of the main gaps in Section
2 of the VRA, namely the difficulty in bringing Section 2 claims at the local level and in rural
communities. The success of the CVRA and CVRA litigation has produced distinct changes in
descriptive representation, particularly for rural Latino communities.91 This is one of the primary
requirement].” These alternative forms are types of at-large systems and thus would likely be
seen as consistent with Article XI, but jurisdictions (particularly those already on thin ice under
the CVRA) may not want to push their luck.
84
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benefits to individual state-VRAs as a whole, but California has specifically seen this benefit
play out.
The success of the CVRA and CVRA litigation has produced distinct changes in descriptive
representation, particularly for rural Latino communities.92 For example, in 2008, a Superior
Court Judge ruled that an-large school board election in Madera, located in central California,
violated the CVRA.93 The suit, brought by the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights against the
Madera Unified School District, complained that 82% of the district’s students are Latino but
only one Latino sits on the seven-member school board.94 The plaintiffs presented evidence that
Latinos have run in school board races eight times in the past twelve years, but have been
defeated in all but one case.95 The legal director for the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights
attributed the Latino vote dilution in Madera to “Anglo bloc voting.”96 In the twenty-five years
preceding the suit, only one Latino had ever served on the school board.97 The Judge tossed out
the results of the at-large election, and required that the three school board seats be replaced by
district-based elections. Today, the District has a Latino Superintendent and three Latinos sit on
the Madera Unified School District school board.98
Most recently, a Superior court Judge in Palmdale held that the city’s at-large elections
violate the CVRA and ordered new, district-based elections.99 In his decision, the judge ordered
the entire Palmdale City Council removed from office by July 2014 and called a special election
to give minorities a fair chance to elect their candidates of choice.100 Several minorities filed suit
in this action, claiming that at-large elections undercut their opportunity to elect candidates of
their choice.101 About two-thirds of Palmdale residents are minorities, but only two minorities
have been elected to the city’s Council since 1962.102 The Judge’s ruling would create four
districts in Palmdale: two of which would be majority-Latino and one would have a “substantial
numbers of Black and Latino residents.”103 While the City has appealed this decision, the current
decision as it stands may have strong precedential value for other cities and school districts that
have been sued for holding at-large elections under the CVRA.104 If the decision is upheld,
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Madera’s school board may serve as strong anecdotal evidence that Palmdale’s new districtbased elections will result in increased descriptive representation for minority candidates.
Due in part to the aforementioned success of CVRA litigation thus far, several jurisdictions
in California with at-large voting systems and significant minority populations, but few or no
minority elected officials, have voluntarily switched to by-district elections to avoid or settle
lawsuits.105 Most notably, this includes the City of Modesto, the fourth-largest city in California
to hold at-large elections.106 This settlement came on the heels of the Fifth District Court of
Appeals ruling in Sanchez v. Modesto, upholding the constitutionality of the CVRA.107 The
court’s decision and settlement arguably strengthened the force of the CVRA, as they “send a
message that the at-large election system is susceptible to challenge, and that [at-large systems]
will be costly to defend.”108 Most recently, the city of Anaheim settled a CVRA suit brought by
the ACLU on behalf of Anaheim minority voters.109 The Settlement Agreement requires the City
Council to place a resolution calling an election in November 2014 for voters to change from an
at-large electoral system to a single member district system.110 A third city, Whittier, has also
been sued over its at-large elections and plans to put the decision to change to district-based
elections to voters in June.111
Relative to the status quo under Section 2 of the VRA, it remains to be seen how successful
the CVRA has been in increasing substantive minority representation. The recent Palmdale
ruling provides some indication that substantive representation can be increased via the CVRA
(namely, through the creation of crossover, coalition, or influence districts that would not
otherwise exist.)112 The impact of the CVRA on substantive representation largely depends on
how districts are drawn in municipalities with voluntarily adopted district-based systems. The
CVRA has also been particularly successful in responding to one of the main gaps in Section 2
of the VRA; namely, the difficulty in bringing Section 2 claims at the local level and in rural
communities. The existence of an individual state-VRA on its own does work to remedy this
issue, but the CVRA has proven effective in its ability to reach local, rural communities.113
Gaps In and Potential Ways to Strengthen the CVRA
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Despite its noted success in many areas, gaps remain in the CVRA. First, CVRA
litigation can be prohibitively costly. As with the VRA, the costs associated with normal
litigation—including trial, discovery, and appeal—add up quite quickly. For example, the
successful Sanchez v. City of Modesto litigation came with a steep price tag upward of $4.5
million.114 Although the statute provides for the awarding of attorney’s fees, such awards are
available only to prevailing plaintiffs. 115 As such, the prospect of losing may deter potential
plaintiffs with otherwise-strong CVRA claims from bringing suit in the first place. A potential
solution—suggested by the proposed Washington legislation (discussed infra)—would be to
allow jurisdictions a window to voluntarily remedy a challenged at-large system. This would
promote settlement from the get-go, thereby greatly reducing the cost to both plaintiffs and
jurisdictions challenged under the CVRA116. Despite the fact that litigation under the CVRA may
still be costly, it could still be less costly as compared to litigation brought under the VRA.117
Courts in California have yet to address whether alternative at-large systems (such as
cumulative, preferred, or limited voting) are valid remedies under the CVRA. Taken together,
the language of Sections 14027 (what systems are prohibited) and 14029 (remedies) seem to
suggest—at least from a textual standpoint—that alternative at-large systems may be considered
as valid CVRA remedies. Requiring “appropriate remedies, including the imposition of districtbased elections” as a violation of the CVRA strongly suggests that CVRA remedies are not
limited to district-based systems.118 If one believes that one of the main goals of the CVRA is to
move toward representation that is more proportional to the size of a minority group’s population
in a given jurisdiction, such alternative at-large systems are entirely consistent with the CVRA.
Additionally, the court has not explicitly ruled on precisely how population size and geographic
compactness factor in to the remedy stage. Given the court’s ruling in Palmdale, it is clear that
majority-minority districts are not a required at the remedy stage under the CVRA.119 However,
it is unclear to what extent geographic compactness and majority-minority districts are desirable
at the remedy stage. Thus, while coalition, crossover, and influence districts clearly seem to be
allowed under the CVRA, it remains unclear to what extent such districts are desired, required,
or implemented, and what shape such districts are required to take.
Relatedly, the CVRA does not appear to allow for vote dilution claims to be brought against
jurisdictions with district-based election systems. Section 14027 merely prohibits an “at-large
method of election” from being “applied in a manner that impairs the ability of a protected class
to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence the outcome of an election, as a result
114
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of the dilution or abridgment of the rights of voters who are members of a protected class…”120
It is clear, then, that Section 14027 prohibits the proscribed conduct as it relates to at-large—but
not district-based—election systems. This can ultimately end up being a significant gap in the
CVRA, as this limitation may ultimately nullify the CVRA. Ideally, at some time in the future,
all jurisdictions will hold district-based (or alternative at-large) elections. Under the CVRA’s
current construction, its protections would cease to exist once there are no longer traditional atlarge election systems operating in California. One might think this is not a big issue, as the
CVRA would have done its job if no at-large systems remain. However, this is problematic
because it is not hard to imagine a district-based system that falls ill to all of the proscribed
conduct laid out in Section 14027. For example, a racial gerrymander that creates one large
majority-minority district in a district-based system (that is, extreme geographic concentration)
may still significantly dilute the minority group’s vote. While this may be better than an at-large
system where the minority group holds zero seats, such a system still has the potential to dilute
minority group votes. This gap could be easily remedied by modifying the language of Section
14027 to include district-based systems as well, but it’s unclear whether that would be a
politically feasible option.
Lastly, the California courts have yet to address precisely what level of “influence” amounts
to a violation of the CVRA under Section 14027. This Section prohibits “at-large methods of
election imposed or applied in a manner that impairs the ability of a protected [class’] ability to
influence the outcome of an election…”121 This leaves open the question of whether a minority
group consisting of, say, less than 5% of the population, would have a valid claim under the
CVRA for its inability to influence the outcome of an election, and raises important questions as
to where the line should be drawn.
There undoubtedly are changes that could be made to strengthen the ability of the CVRA
to protect minority voters against vote dilution. However, it has been largely successful thus far,
as compared to the status quo with respect to at-large elections, in achieving the goal of
increasing descriptive minority representation and broadening the claims and relief available
than those available under the VRA. It is also worth noting that, to date, California has the most
comprehensive individual state-VRA in the country. Thus, there is no doubt that other states
wishing to enact state-VRAs would be wise to use the CVRA as a starting-point.
B. Illinois Voting Rights Act (ILVRA)
Background
In 2011, Illinois governor Pat Quinn signed into law the Illinois Voting Rights Act
(ILVRA). The passage of the ILVRA marked the first time in forty years that redistricting law in
Illinois was changed.122 Leaders in Chicago’s Chinatown neighborhood were the driving force
behind the bill, which sought to remedy situations similar to what happened there following the
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2000 Census.123 Following the 2000 redistricting cycle, the Chinatown neighborhood was split
up into three state Senate and four state House districts.124 This had a serious impact on both the
descriptive and substantive representation for the Chinese-American population there.125
Additionally, with increasing Latino populations in the state, the ILVRA also aimed to guarantee
commensurate representation for Latino voters as well.126

Analysis
Unlike the CVRA, the ILVRA is not structurally modeled on the federal VRA. The
ILVRA, which applies to “any redistricting plan,” is prospective.127 That is, the ILVRA does not
provide a cause of action for voters that have experienced vote dilution in previous elections.
Instead, the ILVRA imposes requirements on the Illinois Legislature (the General Assembly) in
creating future apportionment plans.128 This means that voters that experience past vote dilution
in Illinois (such as Chinese voters in the Chinatown neighborhood) can challenge future
redistricting plans as violative of the ILVRA, as opposed to bringing a vote dilution claim under
the ILVRA. However, plans first must expressly apply with the requirements of the federal
VRA.129 Illinois voters are thus still able to bring vote dilution claims for past dilution under the
federal VRA. Additionally, the requirements under the ILVRA are subordinate to the Illinois
Constitution, United States Constitution, and federal law (including the VRA).130 The ILVRA
takes over where some of the ambiguities in the VRA leave off. Once the state has complied
with the VRA, which generally requires the drawing of a certain number of majority-minority
districts, the ILVRA then requires the Illinois General Assembly to draw additional “crossover
districts, coalition districts, or influence districts,” where possible. 131 By requiring such districts
to be drawn, the ILVRA answers the questions left open by the VRA post-Bartlett and LULAC,
and specifically aims to protect the interests of minorities who may make up less than fifty
percent of a district’s population.132 As such, the ILVRA is intended to “preserve a cluster of
123
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minority voters within a given legislative district if they are of a size and cohesion that could
exert collective electoral power.”133 While the requirement (and, thus, ability) to create
crossover, coalition, and influence districts exists under the ILVRA, it is unclear how far this
requirement extends.134
Like the CVRA, remedies under the ILVRA are extremely open-ended. Section 120/55(e) states: “in the event of a violation of this Act, the redistricting plan shall be drawn to the
least extent necessary to remedy the violation.”135 This appears to allow judges a large amount of
discretion in crafting possible remedies. It is also interesting to note that, since the ILVRA is
primarily concerned with prospective line-drawing remedies in the first place, this provision
seems to simply require more of what is already required under the statute. In addition to being
subordinate to the VRA, the ILVRA borrows slightly from the VRA. For example, the defined
class of protected voters receiving protection under the ILVRA is borrowed from the VRA.136
Success of the ILVRA
The ILVRA has only been in effect since 2011, so anecdotal and statistical data related to
its success is limited to one redistricting cycle. The limited evidence, however, suggests that the
ILVRA has been only somewhat successful in increasing descriptive minority representation.
Following the 2011 redistricting process in Illinois, which complied with the ILVRA, the
Coalition for a Better Chinese American Community was “deeply disappointed” with the Illinois
Congressional map, which continued to divide the Chinatown community into three
Congressional districts.137 The state House and Senate maps, on the other hand, kept the
Chinatown community intact.138 Prior to the 2011 redistricting maps, there were no Legislative
districts with greater than twenty percent Asian population.139 Under the current map, there are
two state House seats and one state Senate seats with greater than twenty percent Asian
populations.140 However, following the 2012 election cycle, there are no Asian-Americans
represented in the Illinois General Assembly.141 This suggests that—if anything—the ILVRA has
been successful thus far only in increasing substantive, not descriptive, representation.
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The state’s Latino population was also dissatisfied with the 2011 maps, asserting that the
map “fractures Latino communities and weakens Latino voting strength.”142 According to the
Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), the 2011 redistricting map
does not create a sufficient number of majority-Latino districts in the state.143 Despite gaining
three majority-Latino districts in the House and one in the Senate (bringing the total to eleven
and five, respectively), MALDEF leaders argue that this is not enough to keep up with the
growing number of Latino residents in Illinois. 144 The group prefers to have a majority of at least
sixty-five percent, which exists in six House districts and no Senate districts.145 This reaction
strongly suggests that while increased substantive representation is a step in the right direction, it
is not enough.
The ILVRA potentially remedies the cost-issue created under the VRA, as it effectively
places the burden on the line-drawers to comply. However, unsatisfied groups that wish to bring
a claim arguing that the ILVRA was not complied with will likely face the same cost-burdens as
is typical for bringing suit. It is clear that the ILVRA has been helpful in increasing substantive
representation for minority communities. To the extent that one believes that increased
descriptive representation is the larger goal of state-VRAs, the ILVRA left something to be
desired following the 2011 redistricting cycle (discussed, supra). However, to the extent that
crossover and coalition districts are authorized under the ILVRA, it may ultimately contribute to
an increase in descriptive representation.
Gaps In and Potential Ways to Strengthen the ILVRA
The requirements of the ILVRA (namely, the creation of crossover, coalition, and
influence districts) are “in addition and subordinate to any requirements or obligations imposed
by the United States Constitution, [any federal law (including the VRA)], and the Illinois
Constitution.146 Further, “nothing in [the Act] shall be construed, applied or implemented in a
way that imposes any requirement or obligation that conflicts with the United States
Constitution, [any federal law (including the VRA)], or the Illinois Constitution.147 This seems
entirely consistent with the VRA. For example, influence districts could easily be drawn in
Illinois without conflicting with any of the statutory or judicial requirements of the VRA.
However, Section 3 of Article 4 of the Illinois Constitution requires Legislative Districts to be
compact and contiguous.148 The courts have yet to address how the ILVRA, VRA, and Illinois
Constitution interact. That is to say that the way the courts define “compactness” for the
purposes of the ILVRA and Illinois Constitution can have a large impact on how the crossover,
coalition, and influence districts are ultimately created. If the courts decide that “compact”
districts are defined narrowly (a la Shaw or LULAC), this can significantly limit the reach of the
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ILVRA in accomplishing its goals, particularly because the ILVRA is explicitly subordinate to
the Illinois Constitution. The courts have yet to go this far, but this is undoubtedly a large
potential gap in the ILVRA. Due in equal part to this lack of explicit interaction and the lack of
case law interpreting the ILVRA, it is somewhat unclear whether the ILVRA is justiciable or
whether it serves as advice and/or guidelines for line-drawers. That is, due to limited evidence, it
is somewhat unclear whether a private plaintiff or an unsatisfied minority group can even bring
suit under the ILVRA. It seems likely that an unsatisfied group could use the ILVRA as a
mechanism to challenge a proposed redistricting plan (that is, to require a plan to be redrawn to
comply), although this did not happen in the 2011 redistricting cycle.
Moreover, the ILVRA’s requirement of creating “crossover, coalition, or influence
districts” lacks force and clarity.149 Influence districts are defined in the ILVRA as “[districts]
where a racial minority or language minority can influence the outcome of an election even if its
preferred candidate is not elected.”150 This is markedly vague, and may not end up providing all
that much protection. This language suggests that a very small (less than 5%) minority
population in a given district is okay, so long as said group can “influence the outcome” of an
election. However, it is not clear how the ability to influence an election’s outcome is defined, or
how a group’s inability to influence an election’s outcome is shown. This open-endedness leaves
considerable room for manipulation by line-drawers. As long as districts are at the very least
influence districts, a map will comply with the ILVRA. While this allows substantive
representation of minority groups to potentially increase, it may come at the expense of increased
descriptive representation, as the Asian-American population experienced in Chinatown
following the 2012 election cycle. This can be easily remedied by adding stronger, more
definitive, bright-line language to the ILVRA. Ideally, this might include a sort of hierarchy of
remedial districts, where coalition, crossover, and then influence districts are favored in that
order. However, it is unclear whether amending the language of the ILVRA would be politically
feasible.
The ILVRA only applies to redistricting plans involving the Illinois General Assembly.151
This is a significant limitation, as it does not apply to Congressional districts or smaller, local
plans. This means that, unlike the CVRA, the ILVRA cannot be used to dismantle local at-large
election systems or any other local election systems that dilute the strength of minority votes.
Again, this can easily be remedied by amending the ILVRA to extend it to local systems as well,
but it is unclear whether such amendments would be politically feasible.

C. Washington Voting Rights Act (WVRA) – Proposed
Background
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The proposed Washington Voting Rights Act (WVRA) was introduced in the
Washington House of Representatives in 2013.152 The WVRA (House Bill 1413/Senate Bill
5473) “prohibits unfair elections in which members of a protected class (members of a racial,
ethnic, or language minority) are unable to influence an election and/or receive adequate
representation in local political subdivisions.”153 The WVRA passed in the 2013 session in the
House, but failed on a party-line Republican vote in the Senate.154 Because the Washington
legislature operates on a two-year cycle, the bill will come up for a vote again in 2014.155 To
date, it remains uncertain whether the bill will pass through both chambers.
The WVRA is intended specifically to impact at-large voting systems utilized in local
elections, though it is not textually limited to at-large elections.156 The bill aims to increase
minority representation in jurisdictions with large minority-populations, as Washington has one
of the lowest levels of minority representation in the country.157 For example, in the ten most
populated Latino communities, where Latinos are a third of the population, they hold only four
percent of elected offices.158
The WVRA is modeled strongly off of the CVRA. The WVRA would apply where voters
from certain communities are being denied an equal opportunity to influence elections.159
Members of a minority group must provide evidence that polarized voting has occurred, and that
members of a protected class do not have an equal opportunity to influence election results.160
Jurisdictions would have two potential options to remedy the situation under the WVRA: they
can voluntarily switch from at-large systems to district-based systems within 45 days (dubbed
the “opt-out” provision), or they can face litigation.
Analysis
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Litigation under the WVRA would only be brought if a jurisdiction, approached about its
WVRA violation, failed to take advantage of the “opt-opt” provision and voluntarily change to a
district-based system within forty-five days.161 By providing this “opt-out clause,” WVRA has
the potential to drastically reduce litigation costs for both plaintiffs and jurisdictions, as
jurisdictions that voluntarily switch would not face any litigation costs.162 The WVRA also
allows local governments to take remedial actions before suit is brought.163 Advocates of the bill
note that the opt-out clause is intended to create “partnership between citizens and local
government, not tension between the two.”164
Like the CVRA, remedies under the WVRA may be broader than the VRA. In the event
of a WVRA violation, district-based elections are not mandated as the only remedy.165 This
seems to suggest that alternative at-large election systems may also be judicially imposed, so
long as they do not deny minority voters an equal opportunity to influence elections.166
Moreover, claims can be brought under the WVRA for district-based elections that deny
minority groups an equal opportunity to influence elections.167
Since the WVRA has yet to be enacted in to law, it is hard to say how strong an impact
the law would have on increasing minority representation. Because the WVRA is so similar to
the CVRA, it is possible that the bill would be similarly successful in increasing descriptive
minority representation. Due to the anticipated lower overall cost of WVRA actions, plaintiffs
may be more active in coming forward to challenge local election systems. Lastly, the ability to
challenge district-based election systems—in addition to the ability to challenge at-large
systems—would likely widen protection for minority voters under the WVRA.

D. State Constitutional Amendments: Florida Fair Districts Amendments
Background
In November 2010, Florida voters approved two state Constitutional amendments
governing legislative apportionment.168 The goal of the amendments was to require the
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Legislature to “redistrict in a manner that prohibits favoritism or discrimination, while respecting
geographic considerations, as well as to require legislative districts to follow existing community
lines so that districts are logically drawn, and bizarrely shaped districts are avoided.”169 The
Florida Fair Districts Amendments imposed more stringent requirements on the Legislature in
the redistricting process. Amongst other requirements, the new Sections 20 and 21 impose on
Congressional and Florida Legislative districts (respectively) a minority voting protection
provision. Specifically, the amendments require that “districts shall not be drawn with the intent
or result of denying or abridging the equal opportunity of racial or language minorities to
participate in the political process or to diminish their ability to elect representatives of their
choice.170 The requirements that districts be equal in population, compact, and utilize existing
political and geographical boundaries are specifically subordinate to the minority voting
protection provision.171 This means that under certain circumstances, compactness may be
compromised to avoid retrogression or vote dilution.172
The Fair Districts Amendments impose two requirements that serve to protect racial and
language minority voters in Florida.173 The first is the prevention of impermissible vote dilution,
while the second is the prevention of impermissible diminishment of a minority group’s ability to
elect a candidate of its choice.174 The court has noted that these two provisions mirror “almost
verbatim” the requirements established by Section 2 and Section 5 of the VRA, respectively.175 It
has also been noted that in addition to the letter, the Florida Fair Districts Amendments are
consistent with the intent behind and principles of the VRA.176 However, the Florida
Constitutional Amendments do not explicitly reference the VRA.177 While the Florida Supreme
Court has looked to the United States Supreme Court for guidance as to how both Sections 2 and
5 have been interpreted, it has honored its constitution obligation to interpret the Florida
Amendments independently of the VRA.178 Thus, despite overarching similarities between the
Florida Amendments and the VRA, there are several interpretational differences (discussed
infra).
Analysis
Both the Section 2 and Section 5 counterparts within the Florida Constitution depart from
the VRA on procedural grounds. After the Florida Legislature draws apportionment plans, the
Supreme Court of Florida is required to review those plans to ensure compliance with the Florida
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Constitution.179 Thus, for the Section 2 counterpart of the Florida Fair Districts Amendments,
this is a procedural departure from the VRA, where private plaintiffs bring claims.180
Additionally, Florida’s Section 5 counterpart applies to the entire state.181 This is a large
departure from Section 5 of the VRA, which applied only to covered jurisdictions that were
obligated to obtain preclearance before the plan could go into effect. Until Shelby County,
Section 5 of the VRA prohibited retrogression in jurisdictions covered under the Section 4
coverage formula. In Shelby County, the Court declared the coverage formula unconstitutional,
thus rendering Section 5 a “zombie provision” with no real force or effect.182 The Florida
Amendments thus have extraordinary implications post-Shelby County, as they breathe life back
in to the protections guaranteed by Section 5 throughout the entire state of Florida. As such, the
Florida Constitution prohibits plans with “retrogressive effects.”183
The Florida Supreme Court has concluded that, by adopting language identical to the
2006 VRA amendment to Section 5, the Legislature cannot eliminate majority-minority districts
or weaken other historically performing minority districts where doing so would actually
diminish a minority group’s ability to elect its preferred candidates.184 This means that in
addition to majority-minority district, coalition or crossover districts that previously provided
minority groups with the ability to elect a preferred candidate under the benchmark plan must
also be recognized.185 However, the Supreme Court of Florida noted that a “slight change in
percentage of [a] minority group’s population in a given district does not necessarily have a
cognizable effect on a minority group’s ability to elect its preferred candidate of choice.”186
Instead, the retrogression inquiry requires evaluation of whether a district is likely to perform for
minority candidates of choice.187 Dubbed a “functional analysis,” this requires consideration of
minority population in the districts, minority voting age population in the districts, political data,
and how a minority population group has voted historically.188
As previously discussed, the Florida Supreme Court has the duty of evaluating whether
an apportionment plan dilutes minority votes. The Florida Supreme Court has noted that, by
adopting identical language, the Amendments codify Section 2 of the VRA.189 However, the
Florida Supreme Court has yet to address whether there would be a violation of Florida’s
minority protection provision with respect to vote dilution if the plan could be drawn to create
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crossover or influence districts.190 In other words, the question of whether the Court’s
interpretation of Section 2 sets a floor and/or a ceiling for the interpretation of the Florida
Amendments remains open.191 The Florida Supreme Court, however, has explicitly left open the
potential for a violation of the Florida minority voting protection provision to be established by a
pattern of over-packing minorities into districts where other coalition or influence districts could
be created.192 This implies that the Florida Supreme Court would be willing to broaden the
amendments to extend further than judicial construction of Section 2 of the VRA does.
Success of the Florida Fair Districts Amendments
As the Florida Fair Districts Amendments have only been in place for one redistricting
and election cycle, there is limited data regarding the Amendments’ success in increasing
minority representation. In evaluating proposed apportionment plans in 2012, the Florida
Supreme Court concluded that neither the state Senate nor House plan facially diluted minority
voting strength as a whole under the Florida Constitution.193 This was so despite the fact that the
House plan arguably over-packed black voters in order to dilute their vote elsewhere.194 In
rejecting this argument, the court notes that none of the black majority-minority districts are
“super-majorities” that require “un-packing”.195 However, the Court did note that several
Hispanic districts did contain such “super-majorities,” but chalked this up to the community’s
dense population in Miami-Dade County.196
In analyzing retrogression in both state Senate and House apportionment plans, the
Florida Supreme Court declared that, like Section 5 of the VRA, districts that increase minority
voting strength when compared to the benchmark statewide are sufficient to pass muster.197 The
Florida Supreme Court noted that the loss of one Hispanic influence district in the Senate was
sufficiently offset by two additional Hispanic majority-minority districts.198 Likewise, the Florida
Supreme Court held that the loss of one black crossover district in the House was offset by one
additional black majority-minority district that emerged from a previously existing crossover
district.199 Additionally, several Hispanic majority-minority districts have emerged from
previously existing influence or crossover districts in the House.200 Facially, this would seem to
suggest that minority descriptive representation has largely increased in the State. However,
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based on the tradeoff between majority-minority districts and influence/crossover districts, this
may come at the expense of increased substantive representation. It is important to note,
however, that the ability to conduct a retrogression analysis in the Courts is a major success
(albeit perhaps an unintended one) of the Florida Fair Districts Amendments in light of the
Court’s ruling in Shelby County.
Gaps in and Ways to Strengthen the Fair Districts Amendments
Consistent with additional Florida constitutional apportionment requirements, the Florida
Supreme Court automatically is tasked with analyzing whether plans comply with the minority
protection provisions. This limits the ability of private plaintiffs to bring suit under the Fair
Districts Amendments. However, well-organized groups seem to be able to oppose
apportionment plans and bring such challenges in court. For example, the League of Women
Voters of Florida, National Council of La Raza, and the NAACP were all named as opponents in
the Court’s In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment decision. Additionally, as
compared with the VRA, CVRA, and ILVRA, this aspect of the amendments may substantially
reduce the overall cost of vote dilution claims, as it puts the proverbial ball in the Florida
Legislature’s court.
Much of the force of the Fair Districts Amendments hinge on how far the Florida
Supreme Court extends the Section 2 counterpart beyond what the federal VRA requires. The
Court has strongly implied that it would be willing to base a violation off of lack of coalition or
influence districts, which would notably expand protection against vote dilution. However, this is
not an option until the court explicitly decides that question under the Amendments.
The Florida Fair Districts Amendments only apply to apportionment plans involving the
Florida Legislature and Congressional apportionment plans.201 Like the ILVRA, this is a
significant limitation, as it does not apply to smaller, local plans. As such, local, at-large election
systems or any other local election systems that dilute the strength of minority votes cannot be
challenged under the Amendments. This can be remedied by further amendments allowing
protection to extend to local systems, but it is unclear whether such amendments would be
politically feasible. It is also unclear as to whether alternative at-large voting systems (i.e.
cumulative, limited, or preferential voting) would be allowed as remedies under the
Amendments.

III. Conclusion
All four state-VRAs are ultimately successful insofar as they expand protection against
minority vote dilution beyond that which is afforded to minority voters under the federal VRA.
The level of success varies by state plan. To date, the CVRA has the most active state-VRA. As
seen from the results thus far under the CVRA, this model has been largely successful in
increasing descriptive representation at the local level throughout the state. Insofar as it has
increased descriptive representation and has actively litigated since its enactment, the CVRA is a
fairly strong state-VRA. By eliminating the first Gingles requirement as found under the VRA,
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the CVRA greatly expands protection for minority voters. The CVRA also has the potential to
greatly expand available remedies than those available under the VRA, however it is limited
insofar as it only currently applies to at-large election systems. If enacted, the WVRA would
likely provide similar protections and remedies. The WVRA, however, would go a step further.
The WVRA’s “opt out” provision could operate to greatly reduce the cost of vote dilution claims
both for plaintiffs and jurisdictions. Additionally, the ability to challenge district-based election
systems in addition to at-large election systems expands the scope of protection for minority
voters. The WVRA would lower litigation costs, allow challenges to district-based plans, and
potentially would allow influence districts and alternative at-large systems as remedies. As such,
if it passes, the WVRA would likely be the strongest state-VRA.
The Florida Fair Districts Amendments are the next strongest model for decreasing
minority vote dilution. While closely analogous to the federal VRA, the Florida Supreme Court
has suggested that it would be willing hold districts liable for lack of coalition or influence
districts, which would notably expand protection. It remains to be seen whether this will be done.
More importantly, by applying the state’s Section 5 counterpart statewide, the Fair Districts
Amendments revive protections under Section 5 of the VRA. This allows for the retrogression
analysis to be applied to apportionment plans statewide, thus increasing descriptive
representation in the State. This has large implications in the wake of Shelby County, and other
states may be well served by following suit. However, the states previously covered by Section 4
(that is, the states to which Section 5 previously applied) are the least likely to pass a state
Constitutional amendment re-instating Section 5 requirements. In fact, many such states have
responded in the opposite way, by passing laws that surely would not have been granted
preclearance under the federal Section 5 regime.202 It is worth noting, however, that it is not out
of the realm of possibility for such amendments to pass by voter-referendum, as occurred in
Florida. Of the eighteen states that allow amendment of the state’s constitution via a voterinitiated process, two were wholly covered under Section 5, and three had specific counties or
townships covered under Section 5.203 Additionally, three had jurisdictions previously covered
by Section 4 that have since bailed out.204 Particularly for the states that were previously wholly
covered, following Florida’s Fair Districts Amendments may be a clever way for voters to
reinstate Section 5 of the VRA if they so choose.
The Illinois VRA has been the least successful of the state models. While it expands the
remedies available to jurisdictions by requiring the creation of crossover, coalition, or influence
districts, this has resulted only in increased substantive representation for minority voters. In
terms of benchmarking, this is ultimately better for minority voters in the State. However, as is
clear from the CVRA and Florida Fair Districts Amendments, stronger legislation is possible. It
is also possible that, over time, the ILVRA will be interpreted to be stronger than it currently
appears.

202

See, e.g., Reilly, Ryan J. "Harsh Texas Voter ID Law 'Immediately' Takes Effect After
Voting Rights Act Ruling." Huffington Post. Huffington Post, 25 June 2013. Web. 13 Feb. 2014.;
see also Pike, Alan G. "Voting Rights and Southern Legislatures Post-Shelby County v. Holder."
Web log post. Southern Spaces, 10 July 2013. Web. 13 Feb. 2014.
203
"Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions." Civil Rights Division Home Page, Web. 12 Feb. 2014,
based on the Section 4 coverage formula
204
Id.
27

Based on the largely successful results of independent state-VRAs, the other forty-six
states would be wise to follow suit. The California (and potentially Washington model) appears
to be the most active thus far, and may be the best starting-point for other states wishing to enact
similar legislation. Florida’s voter-initiated model also has strong implications for reviving
Section 5-style protections in the wake of Shelby County. However, any state that wishes to
expand protection beyond that afforded to its minority voters by the VRA would be wise to
consult any of the four independent state VRAs for guidance. The increases in both descriptive
and substantive representation seen in California, Illinois, and Florida since the enactment of
these policies should speak volumes to the wisdom of independent state VRAs for the rest of the
United States.
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